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Beyond the (Non) Definition of Minority 
This Issue Brief aims to analyse past and present definitions of 'minority' in order to 
evaluate current trends and future opportunities regarding the identifi cation of 
minority rights holders. In so doing, it  assumes that minority identity is part of the 
broader socio-cultural context. Accordingly, the identity of a minority right holder 
refers to the attributes and opportunities associated with being a minorit y, including 
relationships between individuals and groups,  as well as relations between groups. 
Crucially, it regards these attributes, opportunities and relationships as socially 
constructed and therefore context / time specific and changeable. The intent ion here is 
not to endorse a preferred definition of 'minority', but rather to reflect on how scholars 
and practioners should understand and use such definitions.  
 
Jennifer Jackson Preece, February 2014  
ECMI Issue Brief #30 
 
 
I. WHO ARE MINORITY 
RIGHTS HOLDERS? 
Over the last few decades, minority rights have 
become a widely recognized component of 
international and domestic rights regimes.  A 
scholar or practitioner wanting to know more 
about the general form and content of minority 
rights has a growing list of authoritative texts to 
reference, including article 27 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities, the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities, the European Charter for 
Regional and Minority Languages, various 
recommendations and guidelines issued by the 
High Commissioner on National Minorities 
(HCNM), and so forth. These texts provide a 
reasonably clear and increasingly elaborate 
indication of the kind of arrangements currently 
identified as important for the preservation and 
promotion of distinct minority identities within 
states. But there is no article or paragraph within 
them that one can point to where the key 
signifier 'minority' itself is defined.  
 This omission of definition is more than 
a mere curiosity. It has hugely important 
implications with regard to the exercise and 
enforcement of minority rights. A right consists 
of five main elements: (1) a right holder (the 
subject of the right) has (2) a claim to some 
substance (the object of a right) which he or she 
might (3) assert, or demand, or enjoy, or enforce 
(exercising a right) against (4) some individual 
or group (the bearer of the correlative duty) 
citing in support of his or her claim (5) some 
particular ground (the justification of a right)
1
. 
Controversy with regard to the 
definition of a minority centres upon the identity 
of (potential) minority rights holders (the first 
element of a right). Only those recognized 
minority rights holders may assert valid claims 
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for minority rights enforcement; whereas to 
dispute or deny a putative minority identity 
effectively disputes or denies the validity of the 
associated  minority rights claim, to recognize a 
putative minority identity creates a prima facie 
valid basis for the associated minority rights 
claim. In circumstances where the identity of the 
right holder is vague, rights claims tend to be 
correspondingly weak and therefore less likely 
to succeed. Conversely, overly rigid definitions 
(both wide and narrow) may predetermine the 
number of persons in the right holder category 
and thereby also the scope of rights obligations 
incumbent upon the bearer of the correlative 
duty (e.g., the state). 
 
II. RIGHTS AND CONTESTED 
IDENTITIES 
Controversies having to do with the identity of 
right holders are not unique to minority rights. 
They may arise in any rights claim, and are 
particularly prominent with respect to so called 
‗identity rights' – a broad category of rights that 
include claims based upon gender, sexual 
orientation, disability, and indigeneity as well as 
minority status.  
 But within this category of contested 
identity claims, the definitional uncertainty of 
'minority' arguably stands out. Gender and 
sexual orientation, rightly or wrongly, tend to be 
treated as mostly self-explanatory.  In the two 
other cases, even when the key signifiers remain 
contested, there are various legally codified 
definitions academics and practitioners may turn 
to for general guidance. For example, a general 
definition of 'disability' may be found in article 1 
of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
With Disabilities;  
persons with disabilities include those 
who have long-term physical, mental, 
intellectual or sensory impairments 
which in interaction with various 
barriers may hinder their full and 
effective participation in society on an 
equal basis with others
2
. 
Similarly, article 1 of ILO Convention 107 on 
Indigenous and Tribal Populations (1957) refers 
to 
 members of tribal or semi-tribal 
populations in independent countries 
whose social and economic conditions 
are at a less advanced stage than the 
stage reached by the other sections of 
the national community, and whose 
status is regulated wholly or partially 
by their own customs or traditions or 
by special laws or regulations' as well 
as 'members of tribal or semi-tribal 
populations in independent countries 
which are regarded as indigenous on 
account of their descent from the 
populations which inhabited the 
country, or a geographical region to 
which the country belongs, at the time 
of conquest or colonisation and 
which, irrespective of their legal 
status, live more in conformity with 
the social, economic and cultural 
institutions of that time than with the 
institutions of the nation to which they 
belong'
3
. 
Neither of these definitions regarding disability 
and indigeneity are wholly satisfactory – indeed, 
both concepts remain subject to a good deal of 
contestation in law, policy making and academic 
debate. Nonetheless, the existence of codified 
explanatory references does at least provide a 
certain degree of focus to the debate. The same 
cannot be said with respect to the concept of a 
'minority'. No convention or treaty stipulating 
minority rights has ever included an explicit 
definitional provision which clearly identifies 
minority rights holders.  
 
 
 ECMI- Issue Brief  
 
 
5 | P a g e  
 
III. (NOT) DEFINING 
MINORITIES 
The best approximation of a generally applicable 
authoritative definition of minority is that 
proposed in a 1977 study prepared for the UN 
Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities by 
Francesco Capotorti. According to the Capotorti 
definition, a minority is  
a group numerically inferior to the 
rest of the population of a state, in a 
non-dominant position, whose 
members – being nationals of the state 
– possess ethnic, religious or 
linguistic characteristics differing 
from the rest of the population and 
show, if only implicitly, a sense of 
solidarity directed towards preserving 
their culture, traditions, religion or 
language
4
. 
In this formulation, 'minorities' are groups set 
apart by both objective ('ethnic, religious and 
linguistic') characteristics and a subjective 
(sense of solidarity) in circumstances of 
powerlessness ('numerical inferiority' and 'non-
dominance') relative to an implied majority. 
Capotorti does not claim to provide a universal 
definition – instead the definition he proposes is 
deliberately 'limited in its objective' and 'is 
drawn up solely with the application of article 
27 of the [ICCPR] Covenant in mind' 
5
 .Instead, 
Capotorti emphasizes that  
the preparation of a definition capable 
of being universally accepted has 
always proved a task of such difficulty 
and complexity that neither the 
experts in this field nor the organs of 
the international agencies have been 
able to accomplish it to date
6
. 
Speaking at Strasbourg two decades later (in 
1995), the first HCNM, Max van der Stoel, 
noted much the same thing:  
 
I know that groups of experts have 
been sitting for decades trying to 
come to a common definition. They 
have never succeeded in doing this 
and therefore I will not try to give a 
definition on my own
7
. 
And so the lack of definitional clarity persists.  
When the fourth HCNM, Astrid Thors, began 
her term of office on 20 August 2013, the 
'experts' had still failed to resolve this dilemma. 
As both Capotorti and Stoel suggest, this failure 
is not due to a lack of effort. There have been 
many attempts at definitional guidance regarding 
those persons and groups that might legitimately 
claim minority rights. Across these various 
constructions, it is possible to discern at least 
five distinct and recurrent approaches to the 
problem of definition. 
Variations on Capotorti 
Several of these precursors and successors are 
noticeably similar to that definition proposed by 
Capotorti in highlighting various combinations 
of objective, subjective and power criteria. For 
example, in its 1930 Advisory Opinion 
regarding the Greco-Bulgarian Convention, the 
PCIJ described a minority as: 
 a group of persons living in a given 
country or locality, having a race, 
religion, language and traditions of 
their own and united by this identity of 
race, religion, language and 
traditions in a sentiment of solidarity, 
with a view to preserving their 
traditions, maintaining their form of 
worship, ensuring the instruction and 
upbringing of their children in 
accordance with the spirit and 
traditions of their race and rendering 
mutual assistance to each other
8
. 
A half-century later, the Council of Europe's 
Parliamentary Assembly (COEPA) 
 ECMI- Issue Brief  
 
 
6 | P a g e  
 
Recommendation 1134 (1990) characterizes 
'national minorities' in strikingly similar 
language:  
separate or distinct groups, well 
defined and established on the 
territory of a state, the members of 
which are nationals of that state and 
have certain religious, linguistic, 
cultural or other characteristics which 
distinguish them from the majority of 
the population
9
. 
While Capotorti's emphasis on non-dominance 
is noticeably absent from both the PCIJ and a 
COEPA definition, the core content is otherwise 
broadly comparable. So, too, is the definition 
noted in a subsequent (1986) report prepared for 
the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. In 
this attempt, Jules Deschene modifies the 
original Capotorti version to include alongside 
powerlessness an explicit reference to an 
equality remedy:  
 
a group of citizens of a State, 
constituting a numerical minority and 
in a non-dominant position in that 
State, endowed with ethnic, religious 
and linguistic characteristics which 
differ from those of the majority of the 
population, having a sense of 
solidarity with one another, 
motivated, if only implicitly, by a 
collective will to survive and whose 
aim is to achieve equality with the  
majority in fact and in law 
10
. 
Minority as autochonous group  
There is also a noteworthy tendency to privilege 
autochonous groups over and above groups 
comprised of migrants and their descendants that 
might otherwise satisfy the Capotorti criteria.  
While Capotorti himself limits minority status to 
'nationals of the State', he does not specifically 
exclude those migrants or their descendants who 
have become nationals of the State in which they 
reside. However, article 1 of the European 
Charter for Regional and Minority Languages 
(1992) does precisely that. It defines those 
languages within its remit as: 
 traditionally used within a given 
territory of a State by nationals of that 
State who form a group numerically 
smaller than the rest of the State's 
population; and different from the 
official language(s) of the State or the 
languages of migrants
11
. 
 A similar strategy has been adopted by various 
signatories of the Council of Europe's 
Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities (FCNM). According to 
paragraph 12 of its accompanying Explanatory 
Report, the FCNM does not define ‗national 
minority‘ because it was ' impossible to arrive at 
a definition capable of mustering general 
support of all Council of Europe member 
States'
12
. As a result, signatory states either set 
out their own definition when they ratified the 
FCNM or stipulated a working definition in their 
first state report on national compliance with 
FCNM undertakings. Many of these state 
signatories privilege autochonous groups either 
by naming specific 'historic' groups to whom the 
FCNM will apply, by openly excluding non-
citizens and / or (im)migrant-origin groups,  by 
applying a qualifying time period of presence 
within the State, or some combination thereof.  
For example, in the Netherlands, national 
minorities are understood to be ' those groups of 
citizens who are traditionally resident within the 
territory of the State and who live in their 
traditional/ancestral settlement areas, but who 
differ from the majority population through their 
own language, culture and history – i.e. have an 
identity of their own – and who wish to preserve 
that identity'
13
. Accordingly, the Framework 
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Convention has been declared applicable 'only to 
the Frisians in the Netherlands, as it is only the 
Frisians who fulfil these criteria within the 
Netherlands'
14
. 
 In a similar vein, the Republic of 
Croatia considers national minorities under the 
FCNM to be  members of the 'autochthonous 
national minorities' as set out in its 
Constitution
15
 .The Constitution of the Republic 
of Croatia identifies as 'autochthonous 
minorities'  Serbs, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, 
Hungarians, Jews, Germans, Austrians, 
Ruthenians, and Ukrainians who are citizens of 
the Republic of Croatia. 
 Alternatively, Hungary applies its 
FCNM obligations in accordance with 
Subsection (2) of Section 1 of its  Minorities 
Act, according to which ' national and ethnic 
minorities are all groups of people that have 
lived in Hungary for at least one century; they 
represent a numerical minority in the country's 
population; their members are Hungarian 
citizens; they are distinguished from the rest of 
the population by their own languages, cultures, 
and traditions; they demonstrate a consciousness 
of an affinity that is aimed at preserving all of 
these and expressing and protecting the interests 
of their historical communities
16
. According to 
this Act, those national groups considered native 
to Hungary are: Bulgarians, Gypsies, Greeks, 
Croatians, Poles, Germans, Armenians, 
Romanians, Ruthenians, Serbians, Slovakians, 
Slovenians, and Ukrainians. 
 Meanwhile, Bill 1998/99:143 National 
Minorities in Sweden identifies that the 
following criteria  should be satisfied for a group 
to be regarded as a national minority there: (1) 
groups with a pronounced affinity who, as 
regards numbers in relation to the remainder of 
the population, have a non-dominating position 
in society; (2) religious, linguistic, traditional 
and/or cultural belonging that distinguish it from 
the majority; (3) the individual and also the 
group should have a desire and ambition to 
retain their identity; and (4) finally, the group 
should have an 'historic or long bond with 
Sweden' 
17
.The Government of Sweden 'does not 
consider that it is possible to draw an absolute 
limit measured in years' but asserts that 'minority 
groups whose minority culture existed in 
Sweden prior to the 20th century may be said to 
satisfy the requirement' 
18
. 
 Such privileging of time and tradition 
over and above other objective or subjective 
characteristics is not without controversy. It goes 
against United Nations General Comment No.  
23: the rights of national minorities (1994) 
where the Office of the High Commissioner of 
Human Rights affirms that degree of 
permanence within the state is irrelevant to 
minority rights arising under article 27 ICCPR:  
 
those rights simply are that 
individuals belonging to those 
minorities should not be denied the 
right, in community with members of 
their group, to enjoy their own 
culture, to practise their religion and 
speak their language. Just as they 
need not be nationals or citizens [note 
that this is contrary to Capotorti]   
they need not be permanent residents. 
Thus, migrant workers or even visitors 
in a State party constituting such 
minorities are entitled not to be 
denied the exercise of those rights. As 
any other individual in the territory of 
the State party, they would, also for 
this purpose, have the general rights, 
for example, to freedom of 
association, of assembly, and of 
expression. The existence of an ethnic, 
religious or linguistic minority in a 
given State party does not depend 
upon a decision by that State party but 
requires to be established by objective 
criteria
19
. 
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That said, paragraph 10 of Asbjørn Eide's 2005 
Commentary on the UN Declaration on 
Minorities acknowledges that  
 
while citizenship as such should not 
be a distinguishing criterion that 
excludes some persons or groups from 
enjoying minority rights under the 
Declaration, ….Those who have been 
established for a long time on the 
territory may have stronger rights 
than those who have recently 
arrived
20
. 
In Eide's view (see paragraph 11 of his 
commentary),  
the 'best approach' appears to be to 
avoid making an absolute distinction 
between “new” and “old” minorities 
by excluding the former and including 
the latter, but to recognize that in the 
application of the Declaration the 
“old” minorities have stronger 
entitlements than the “new”21. 
Minority as individual choice 
Still other definitions take a quintessentially 
liberal approach to the problem of identifying 
minorities and resolve this under the guise of 
individual choice. Thus, for example, paragraph 
32 of the 1990 Copenhagen Document  
maintains that to belong to a national minority is 
a matter of a person‘s individual choice and no 
disadvantage may arise from the exercise of 
such choice' 
22
. Yet even in this liberal 
orientation, choice is not arbitrary but remains 
constrained by subjective and / or objective 
criteria. Already in1993, HCNM Max van der 
Stoel was quick to make this caveat:  
 In this connection I would like to 
quote the Copenhagen Document of 
1990, which is of fundamental 
importance to minorities' issues within 
CSCE. It states that “To belong to a 
national minority is a matter of a 
person's individual choice”. Even 
though I may not have a definition of 
what constitutes a minority, I would 
dare to say that I know a minority 
when I see one. First of all, a minority 
is a group with linguistic, ethnic or 
cultural characteristics which 
distinguish it from the majority. 
Secondly, a minority is a group which 
usually not only seeks to maintain its 
identity but also tries to give stronger 
expression to that identity
23
. 
The Explanatory Report which accompanies the 
Framework Convention provides a similar 
cautionary note: while 'Paragraph 1 leaves it to 
every such person to decide whether or not he or 
she wishes to come under the protection flowing 
from the principles of the framework 
Convention', this paragraph 'does not imply a 
right for an individual to choose arbitrarily to 
belong to any national minority'
24
.  Instead, 'the 
individual‘s subjective choice is inseparably 
linked to objective criteria relevant to the 
person‘s identity'. 
Adjectives in lieu of definitions 
The various interwar treaties which established 
the League of Nations System of Minority 
Guarantees did not contain any definition of 
'minority' but instead simply referred to 'persons 
who belong to racial, religious  or linguistic 
minorities' or named specific groups considered 
especially vulnerable (e.g., Jews in Poland and 
Muslims in Yugoslavia). A similar tactic was 
adopted by the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities. According 
to Eide (in paragraph 7 of his commentary), 'the 
Declaration does not, in its substantive 
provisions, make distinctions between these 
categories' but this 'does not exclude the 
possibility that the needs of the different 
 ECMI- Issue Brief  
 
 
9 | P a g e  
 
categories of minorities could be taken into 
account in the interpretation and application of 
the various provisions'
25
. 
Facts in lieu of definitions 
Another recurrent approach taken by 
international organisations is to assert the 
primacy of 'fact' over 'definitions'. As early as 
1928, in the Upper Silesia Schools Case,  the 
PCIJ ruled (see paragraph 97 of the judgement) 
that whether or not a person belonged to a 
minority was a 'question of fact and not solely 
one of intention'
26
. The text of article 27 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights similarly prioritize fact phrased as 
existence: 
 In those States in which ethnic, 
religious or linguistic minorities exist, 
persons belonging to such minorities 
shall not be denied the right, in 
community with the other members of 
their group, to enjoy their own 
culture, to profess and practise their 
own religion, or to use their own 
language
27
.  
Max van der Stoel, said much the same thing in 
1993 when he remarked that 'the existence of a 
minority is a question of fact and not of 
definition...'
28
. Subsequently, in 1995, Stoel 
provided further insight into what he took to be 
the 'determining facts' regarding a national 
minority:  
 It is a group with an identity of its 
own which clearly distinguishes it 
from that of a majority and in addition 
it has the clear wish to maintain or 
even to strengthen that identity. And 
my experience is – and probably yours 
– that you recognize a national 
minority when you see it 
29
. 
Thus, once more, emphasis is placed on a 
mixture of subjective and objective criteria in 
identifying minority right holders.  
These five recurrent approaches to the definition 
of minorities are not simply heterogeneous. 
They imply divergent views of identity (what 
comprises it) and power (who ought properly to 
exercise it). Admittedly, there are affinities 
between them, as, for example, in the privileging 
of State nationals in the first (variations on 
Capotorti) and third (autochonous) or in the 
emphasis on subjective determination in the first 
(variations on Capotorti) and fourth (choice). 
But there are strong tensions as well. The fourth 
(adjectives) and fifth (facts) reject subjectivity 
while the third (choice) rejects objectivity and 
the first (Capotorti) and second (autochonous) 
attempt to combine the objective with the 
subjective.  
 
IV. IDENTIFICATION AND 
(DIS)EMPOWERMENT 
If the goal in this debate is to better understand 
that process through which persons with certain 
attributes come to share a definition of 
themselves and their predicament in terms of a 
'minority', it is arguably best to go about it in a 
manner that highlights the contingent and 
variable relationship between identity and 
power. And in order accomplish that, it is first 
necessary to disentangle the particular use of 
minority from the broader, and more generic, 
concept of 'identity' to which it relates.  
 A 'minority' is a type of 'identity'.  As 
such, the term minority may refer to either a 
social category and / or a personal identity. 
Identity including minority identity used as a 
social category refers to a group of persons 
distinguished by (alleged) characteristic features 
or attributes and a name that is commonly used 
either by the people designated, others, or both. 
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The social category usage occurs most 
frequently in the definitional debates 
surrounding minority as can be seen in 
Capotorti's definition, those definitions which 
are variations of Capotorti, as well as in 
definitions which emphasize autochonous status. 
At the same time, identity including minority 
identity may also designate a personal identity 
defined by a distinguishing characteristic (or 
characteristics) that an individual 'takes a special 
pride in or views as socially consequential' 
30
 
.The personal identity usage is less prominent 
within the definitional debate on minority, but it 
clearly resonates with the liberal concern to 
privilege choice as a crucial factor in the 
exercise of minority rights. 
 Much of the political force and 
normative interest in the generic 'identity' and 
the more specific ‗minority‘ derives from the 
implicit linkage between these two usages, 
namely the core assumption that social 
categories are bound up with the bases of an 
individual's self-worth
31
. Whether as social 
category or as personal identity, the concepts 
identity and minority require the awareness of 
self and other. Both those who possess the 
identity as well as those who do not are expected 
to have knowledge of that identity. In the 
definitional debate surrounding 'minority', this 
duality is commonly expressed in terms of a 
tension between the subjective and the objective, 
the values and interests of the minority group or 
individual member versus  the  values and 
interests of the wider society designated as the 
'majority'. Indeed, much of the history of 
argumentation over minority identity invokes the 
privileging of so called objective over subjective 
criteria or, less commonly, of subjective over 
objective criteria. 
 The crucial distinction between the more 
generic concept of identity and the specific 
concept of minority is the presumption of 
(dis)empowerment attached to the latter. Identity 
per se is taken to be or ought to be, a source of 
individual esteem and collective action. Yet the 
predicament of minorities is construed as 
precisely the reverse, a situation of individual 
disesteem and collective inaction . A minority is 
thus a social category or personal identity that is 
fundamentally, and (when compared with the 
generic identity) perversely, disempowering. 
Francesco Capotorti expresses this core 
qualification ascribed to minorities in terms of 
'non-dominance'. Whereas majorities are 
imagined as powerful (the quintessential 
insiders), minorities are imagined as powerless 
(the quintessential outsiders). The exercise of 
minority rights is intended to overcome or 
ameliorate this perceived power differential. 
Recognition as a minority right holder is thus 
imagined as fundamentally empowering, which 
may explain Jules Deschene's emphasis on 'the 
aim to achieve equality with the majority in fact 
and in law'.  
 A crucial problem with many of the 
definitional approaches to minority as both 
social category and personal identity is the 
tendency to treat each of these usages as clearly 
bounded and immutable when in practice they 
are multiple, overlapping, and  time / place 
contingent. As a result, not only are 'social 
categories' socially constructed but so also are 
peoples' sense of themselves as distinct 
individuals. Neither a purely objective nor a 
purely subjective nor even a dualist objective vs. 
subjective approach is adequate to fully 
comprehend the combined self and other 
dynamic that underscores minority identity. 
Instead, both minority (and majority) identity is 
better understood as intersubjective, that is at 
once part shared and part idiosyncratic. It is 
precisely this intersubjectivity which gives rise 
to that variation of observable minority / 
majority power relationships with which 
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minority rights must contend. ALL of the 
following minority / majority scenarios are 
possible and may be experienced by the same 
person albeit in different contexts: (1)  an 
individual recognizes him or herself as 
belonging to a minority and is recognized and 
positively affirmed as such by others; (2) an 
individual recognizes him or herself as 
belonging to a minority but is not so recognized 
by others; (3)  an individual self-identifies as a 
minority and is so recognized by others  but 
experiences inequality or disesteem as a result; 
(4) an individual is recognized  as a minority by 
others,  whether positively or negatively, while 
not considering that minority identity personally 
meaningful or significant at least some and 
perhaps even most of the time. Arguably, NONE 
of the five main minority formulas are fully able 
to engage with these multiple and potentially 
concurrent possibilities because they lack an 
intersubjective awareness. 
 This theoretical insight derived from 
that body of social constructivist scholarship is 
particularly relevant to minority circumstances 
because it underscores how a social process 
beyond the individual's control crucially shapes 
identities the individual may understand as 
deeply personal. In any category of identity 
(e.g., gender, disability, race, ethnicity, etc.), 
self-identifications (who I think I am) will 
inevitably be inextricably linked with other-
identifications (who you think I am). Self-
identification is always in significant measure a 
response to prevailing identification by others 
(us versus them). At the same time, other-
identification may also be a response to rival 
self-identifications (them versus us), especially 
where prevalent asymmetries of power are 
involved (e.g., as between minorities and 
majorities). These social processes of inter-
connected self and other-identification are 
arguably the key to maintaining, and thus 
potentially also overcoming, minority 
(dis)empowerment. 
 
V. FRAMING MINORITIES AND 
MAJORITIES 
The process of 'framing' as derived from social 
movement theory provides an important insight 
into the dynamics of that self / other 
identification process which creates, perpetuates 
but may also transform existing minority / 
majority identities. 'Frames' - or the norms and 
ideas we selectively use to characterize subjects 
- influence the ways in which we think about 
and respond to those same subjects. From this 
perspective, the identification of social 
categories like minority or majority  are 
understood to involve power relationships 
between a communicator and a target audience 
both of whom are  embedded in a particular 
cultural context
32
.  
 Framing is 'an active processual 
phenomenom that implies agency and 
contention...it is active in the sense that 
something is being done and processual in the 
sense that what is evolving is the work of 
organisations or actors'
33
. Crucially, framing is 
also deliberate and goal-directed: 'frames are 
developed and deployed to achieve a specific 
purpose—to recruit new members, to mobilize 
adherents, to acquire resources, and so forth'
34
. 
In general, frames are more likely to influence 
the target audience if they are cognitively 
plausible, dramatically compelling, and resonate 
with pre-existing social narratives and shared 
cultural values 
35
.   
 This social-cultural dimension is 
particularly relevant to 'movements that have 
been stigmatized because their beliefs and / or 
values contradict the dominant culture‘s core 
values'
36
 and to 'movements reliant on 
conscience constituents who are strikingly 
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different from the movement beneficiaries'
37
. 
Significantly, both of these important caveats 
regarding socio-cultural resonance apply to the 
minority rights discourse. As already noted, the 
minority predicament is assumed to be one of 
non-dominance and is commonly juxtaposed 
against the dominant (majority) culture.  As with 
all rights based movements, minority rights are 
reliant on actors (international organisations, 
non-governmental organisations, states, etc.) 
other than the putative minority rights holders. A 
process framing approach to minority self and 
other identification thus draws our attention to 
continuities and discontinuities between pre-
existing socio-cultural norms and current efforts 
to overcome social, economic and political 
inequalities between persons belonging to 
different groups. For the purpose of this Issue 
Brief, conceptualizing minority identity in terms 
of a framing process is therefore doubly useful: 
(1) it offers the basis for a theory of political 
action linked to identity construction; and (2) it 
suggests a method of analysis in which to 
evaluate the socio-cultural resonance of putative 
minority identifications with their respective 
target audience
38
.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The goal of this Issue Brief has not been to 
argue in favour of a preferred definition of 
'minority'; instead, its express aim has been to 
reflect upon how scholars and practioners should 
understand and use such definitions. The great 
irony here is that as lived socio-cultural / 
political reality 'minority identity' is heavily 
loaded and deeply contested, and yet scholars 
and practioners have no good alternative to the 
concept ‗minority‘. As a result, it is absolutely 
essential that scholars and practioners adopt a 
critical and self-reflexive stance towards their 
use of 'minority' and indeed its alter ego 
'majority'. This means, most obviously, 
emphasizing that their use of the concept 
'minority' does not designate a homogeneous 
socio-cultural group but a heterogeneous 
category of self and other identification. Beyond 
this, and more substantively, it means focusing 
on the changing ways in which the category 
'minority' is applied by various actors (e.g., 
states, international organisations, non-
governmental organisations, scholars, 
journalists, etc.) irrespective of whether they 
purport to represent minorities, majorities or 
various conscience constituents.  
Accordingly, the minority research 
agenda should concentrate explanatory effort 
upon the social processes of identification as a 
minority. Whereas a definition is 'a statement 
expressing the essential nature of something', 
'identification' is an active term derived from the 
verb 'to identify' meaning 'to recognize or 
distinguish'
39
.  For this reason Brubakers and 
Cooper contend that it lacks the 'reifying 
connotations of identity'
40
. Because 
identification is a social process it is arguably 
better able to characterize nuanced power 
differentials and to explain how power dynamics 
may change both between actors and across time 
and place (as per the minority / majority 
scenarios noted in this Issue Brief). If, as 
described here, the minority predicament is 
fundamentally one of (dis)empowerment, and if 
the exercise of minority rights is intended to 
ameliorate that predicament through 
empowerment, then a process based approach 
has clear advantages over a concept based 
approach. By applying insights from the social 
movement literature on 'process frames', we can 
analyse the competing constructions of 
'minority' in self and other discourses, rather 
than unwittingly reinforcing them. When the 
analysis shifts from concept to process, the 
definitional quagmire itself is revealed to be yet 
another social process of identification where 
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each variation is intended to preserve and 
promote a distinct minority / majority power 
dynamic. Ultimately, minority empowerment 
requires more than simply to 'know a minority 
when you see one'; it invites both the scholar 
and the practitioner to ask who is  the seer and 
who is the seen, where are they looking from 
and what are they looking at, and to what 
purpose is their knowledge directed. 
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